I am a first year Ph. D. student at UC Berkeley working in computer security. I graduated last Spring with a B.A. in computer science and in mathematics, also from UC Berkeley.
I was an intern this last summer at Matasano Security doing security testing and a bunch of other fun stuff.
I occasionally look for vulnerabilities in websites. (There’s a reasonable chance if you’ve found this site, it’s because of that.) I’m on the PayPal and Google halls’ of fame for bugs I found. A while ago, I found several vulnerabilities in Squirrel Mail:
USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems (JETS), Volume 1 Issue 1. Presented at EVT/WOTE 2013.
Eric Kim, Nicholas Carlini, Andrew Chang, George Yiu, Kai Wang, and David Wagner.
This paper studies how to provide support for ballot-level post-election audits. Informed by our work supporting pilots of
these audits in several California counties, we identify gaps in current technology in tools for this task: we need better ways
to count voted ballots (from scanned images) without access to scans of blank, unmarked ballots; and we need improvements
to existing techniques that help them scale better to large, complex elections. We show how to meet these needs and use our
system to successfully process ballots from 11 California counties, in support of the pilot audit program. Our new techniques
yield order-of-magnitude speedups compared to the previous system, and enable us to successfully process some elections
that would not have reasonably feasible without these techniques.
Kai Wang, Eric Kim, Nicholas Carlini, Ivan Motyashov, Daniel Nguyen, and David Wagner.
We present OpenCount: a system that tabulates scanned
ballots from an election by combining computer vision
algorithms with focused operator assistance. OpenCount
is designed to support risk-limiting audits and to be scalable to large elections, robust to conditions encountered
using typical scanner hardware, and general to a wide
class of ballot types--all without the need for integration with any vendor systems. To achieve these goals,
we introduce a novel operator-in-the-loop computer vision pipeline for automatically processing scanned ballots while allowing the operator to intervene in a simple,
intuitive manner. We evaluate our system on data collected from five risk-limiting audit pilots conducted in
California in 2011.
Nicholas Carlini, Adrienne Porter Felt, and David Wagner.
Vulnerabilities in browser extensions put users at risk by
providing a way for website and network attackers to
gain access to users’ private data and credentials. Extensions can also introduce vulnerabilities into the websites
that they modify. In 2009, Google Chrome introduced
a new extension platform with several features intended
to prevent and mitigate extension vulnerabilities: strong
isolation between websites and extensions, privilege separation within an extension, and an extension permission
system. We performed a security review of 100 Chrome
extensions and found 70 vulnerabilities across 40 extensions. Given these vulnerabilities, we evaluate how well
each of the security mechanisms defends against extension vulnerabilities. We find that the mechanisms mostly
succeed at preventing direct web attacks on extensions,
but new security mechanisms are needed to protect users
from network attacks on extensions, website metadata attacks on extensions, and vulnerabilities that extensions
add to websites. We propose and evaluate additional defenses, and we conclude that banning HTTP scripts and
inline scripts would prevent 47 of the 50 most severe vulnerabilities with only modest impact on developers.